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Abstract
The range of the real freedom of contracts in private law was both a growth factor of societies as well 
as a measure of the extent of their internal changes. The practice worked out by the Roman lawyers, 
though limited formally by contract nominalism, became the basis of modern-day solutions. In spite of 
a simultaneous reconstruction of the social and economic systems which may be summed up after H. 
Maine as a development from status to contract – the principles of the freedom of contract together with 
their fundamental limitations, had remained valid. In this context, one may mention the laws which 
protect the rights of economically weaker subjects, such as the ban on the loss of the pledged asset (lex 
commissoria), the permissible relation of the price to the value during sale transactions (laesio enor-
mis), maximum prices on basic goods (edictum Diocletanii de pretiis rerum venalium). 
A special but continually valid issue which is analyzed, among others by Cicero, is that of mutual hon-
esty of vendors and purchasers: to what extent can they make use of the information which is unknown 
to the other party; at what point we can say that they have overstepped the boundary-line of stratagem. 
As regards the latter issue, there is no uniformity of opinion in different legal systems; it seems that it 
is the principle of maximum facilitation of trade that takes the upper hand and is not unknown to the 
Roman law. The author of the article also analyzes the beginnings of actio de dolo and the different 
contemporary court experience. In conclusion, the author poses an open question concerning the future 
of contract law in view of the too far advanced freedom of contracts.
Key words: freedom of contracts, freedom of agreements, contract nominalism, pledged asset, loss of 
pledged asset, just price, sale, stratagem, error, comparative study, private law, Roman law
Słowa klucze: wolność umów, zasada nominalizmu, zastaw, przepadek zastawu, słuszna cena, sprzedaż, 
podstęp, błąd, komparatystyka, prawo prywatne, prawo rzymskie
Contractual relations are almost as old as the mankind and even older than the concept of 
society. Long before rules became law, people knew how to exchange or buy goods, hire 
land or worker even when no money was known. The inner feeling of the “contractual 
obligation” and “contractual liability” is well known even to small children exchanging 
* This paper is to honour reverent Professor Doctor Kazimierz Baran, whose lectures and tutor’s aid were 
invaluable in my legal education.
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or lending and borrowing their toys. Indeed Roman law put various ancient sources into 
one package giving this abiding, powerful set of tools to lawyers willing to dominate 
trade and business. Over twenty centuries of history could not undo the contribution 
Roman lawyers made to modern law.
It is more a matter of society rather than lawyers to discuss the question of how far 
the “freedom of contracts1” should go because, above all, it infl uences social and eco-
nomic relations. Even laissez-faire systems must be kept in certain minimal boundaries 
by lawmakers. Roman law, with an almost non-existing protection of the socially weaker 
party had such limits, but scanty and introduced rather late. A good example is lex com-
missoria (D.18,3).2 This early Roman legal practice allowed to secure debts by a pledge, 
and the creditor became their owner immediately after the fi xed term of payment passed. 
One should have in mind the difference between the amount of the debt and the value 
of the pledge, which led debtors to poverty while lex commissoria became the best busi-
ness for unscrupulous ancient bankers. This shows us how freedom of contracts works: 
in general it is useful, but it may kill the user as well. The debtor is fully aware of the 
consequences of not repaying the debt on time. However, thousands of poor families 
decided to borrow money and secure it with their last valuables or a piece of land. This 
gambling with time was often lost as they did not manage to pay back on time and lex 
commissoria deprived them of their property. To protect the poorest, in a way from them-
selves, emperor Constantine the Great banned lex commissoria in 326 A.D. (C.8,35,3). 
This interdict had to be repeated later, as it was very useful for creditors. The problem 
well-known not only in the Roman Empire, the medieval English Chancery jurisdic-
tion (equity of redemption) faced it as well. The issue was even discussed by the 4th 
Lateran Council (canon 59). Many contemporary regulations exclude using lex commis-
soria (Polish art. 313 k.c., §1229 BGB Verbot der Verfallvereinbarung3). However, both 
Roman and modern law allowed for a simple contract of sale with a repurchase clause 
(pactum de retroemendo) in which the repurchase price could easily be increased by 
a hidden (illegal amount) interest rate. If the “vendor” (debtor) had not been able to pay 
1 For freedom of contracts see in general R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations 
of the Civilian Tradition, Juta&Co, Ltd 1990; K. Zweigert, H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 
Clarendon Press 1998; E.A. Farnsworth, Comparative Contract Law [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Compar-
ative Law, eds. M. Reimann, R. Zimmermann, Oxford 2006, pp. 919–935; P. Huber, Comparative Sales Law 
[in:] The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, pp. 938–967; M.J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of 
Contracts, Cambringe 1997, The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, ed. F.H. Buckley, Durkam 1999; from 
the social and economic perspective see P. Cserne, Freedom of Contract and Paternalism, New York 2012. 
For relations between law and economy in Roman times see A. Wacke, Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Konkurren-
zverbotsklauseln in antiken und modernen Recht, “Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung Romanische Abteilung” 
1982, Bd. 91, p. 188–215 and a summary Freedom of Contract and Restraint of Trade Clauses in Roman and 
Modern Law, “Law and History Review” 1993, vol. 11, No.1, pp. 1–19.
2 A. Burdese, Lex commissoria e ius vendendi nella fi ducia e nel pignus, Torino 1949, A. Biscardi, La 
„lex commissoria” nel sistema delle garanzie reali, [in:] Studi in onore di E. Betti, vol. II, Milano 1962, 
p. 573–589, P. Freeza, La garanzie delle obbligazioni. Corso di diritto Romano II, Padova 1963, F. Peters, 
Der Erwerb des Pfandes durch den Pfandglaubiger im klassischen und nachklassischen Recht [in:] Studien in 
Römischen Recht, Berlin 1973, p. 150–153. On the identical (no surplus was due) creditor’s right to purchase 
the pledged item for the price consisting of due loan and interests (Fragmenta Vaticana 9) see recently M. Sic, 
Why the opinion of Papinian preserved by Fragm. Vat 9 was not inserted into Justinian’s Digest? “Acta 
Universitatis Sapientiae, Legal Studies” 2012, vol. 1(1), p. 107–127.
3 P. Bülow, Recht der Kreditsicherheiten: Sachen und Rechte, Personen, Hüthig Jehle Rehm 2012, p. 201.
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his debt on time, the “subject of sale” (pledge) could not have been bought back. This 
gave way to legal short-term, pledge-secured loans offered by pawnshops under strict 
anti-usury regulations which brought the same result as the forbidden lex commissoria. 
This means that the parties achieve the same goal by using a different type of contracts, 
which is a fully legal practice.
However, the real social problem worth discussing here is not the threat of losing 
property, but losing it for a totally inadequate value. Another very similar example is 
the price-to-value relation in the contract of sale. There is no use discussing the problem 
from the purely legal point of view, since it has the same social dimension as lex commis-
soria. If not by mistake or lack of knowledge, why should anyone agree to sell their land, 
jewellery or a horse for half of their value? The simple answer was given a long time ago 
by the brilliant Lord Chancellor Robert Henley in the famous Vernon vs. Bethell (1762) 
judgment: “necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men”.4 This sentence demon-
strates the essence of the contractual freedom and links Emperor Constantine’s ancient 
decision with modern ‘unfairness’ rules, like BGB §138(2) Ausbeutung der Zwangslage 
or its Polish equivalent, k.c. art. 388§1 wyzysk przymusowego położenia.5
The above mentioned issues are refl ected in the modern English law by economic 
duress.6 However, this defense is only possible when one party threatens the other to ter-
minate the already existing contract so that the weaker party has to accept the new con-
tract under worse conditions. It clearly differs from the continental solutions, where no 
preexisting contract is demanded. Under English law, similar situations, but not bound 
to the previous contractual relation may be subject to undue infl uence, in which parties 
remain in the special relationship of trust.7
Although modern law seems to be well equipped with tools against unfairness, they 
are rarely used, which unfortunately is not the result of fairness in social relations. The 
Polish k.c. art. 388§1 is a good example: it requires the court to decide whether the case 
fi ts the conditions of the rule, so it usually involves a longer and less effi cient, but more 
expensive procedure with professional legal aid. Would-be plaintiffs, parties suffering 
unfair contractual treatment usually cannot afford it or simply are not aware of their 
rights. We need to emphasize: unfair exploitation is defi nitely not another defect of will, 
it ought to be understood as the substantive content of the contract, consciously known 
to both parties. This consciousness should never affect the validity of the contract: if it 
comes to a serious inadequacy of the counter performance through the unfair exploita-
tion, such a contract is void. As the Polish Court of Appeal decided in 2004 – if you go 
to a pawnshop being fully aware of the necessity to accept strict loan terms, you are in 
4 “This court, as a court of conscience, is very jealous of persons taking securities for a loan, and convert-
ing such securities into purchases. And therefore I take it to be an established rule, that a mortgagee can never 
provide at the time of making the loan for any event or condition on which the equity of redemption shall be 
discharged, and the conveyance absolute. And there is great reason and justice in this rule, for necessitous 
men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the 
crafty may impose upon them” (1762) 28 ER 838, 2 Eden 110.
5 Ł. Węgrzynowski, Ekwiwalentność świadczeń w umowie wzajemnej (Equivalency in counterperfor-
mance contracts) Warszawa 2011.
6 See G. Virgo, Principles of the Law of Restitution, Oxford 1999, p. 205.
7 N. Enonchong, Duress, Undue Infl uence and Unconscionable Dealing, Andower 2006.
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the state of an imposed position and may be regarded unfairly exploited.8 On the other 
hand, in 2012 another Polish court decided that your personal need to obtain cash does 
not place you in the state of an imposed position.9 We can clearly see – and understand – 
that the interpretation of the general rule of code may indeed be diffi cult.
The lack of an equal rule in the French civil code may seem strange; however, the 
French solved the problem in a very similar way to the Romans – by using pretorian 
actio de dolo or exceptio doli. 111610 of the Code Civil expresses the institution of dol: 
i when it came to unfair losses by exploiting the contractual party’s age, illness or inex-
perience, the unfairly exploited party may have claimed the contract void. This particular 
solution seems to fi t the need better than the rules applied in other countries, with the 
effect somehow similar to unjust enrichment. Both the German and Polish procedure 
requires also the plaintiff to prove the present imposed position.
Let’s return to the question of whether the law should allow you to sell your house 
for the price not relevant to its value if you cannot afford to wait for a better offer. The 
late imperial rule allowed to void the contract in case the land was sold for less than half 
of its value (laesio enormis, C. 4, 44, 2; C. 4, 44, 8).11 But for Roman lawyers, generally 
considered liberal, pretium iustum (fair or just price) was never a must,12 as it was a sov-
ereign matter of pater familias. There was no need for a general protecting rule, since 
different members of the society had their own safeguards (women, soldiers, children, 
inexperienced youths), not to mention the bonae fi dei procedure in many contract-based 
claims. Although there were some attempts of emperors to interfere with prices (the 
famous edictum Diocletanii de pretiis rerum venalium and laesio enormis), it hardly 
ever worked.13 We should remember the Roman private law was above alla a tool to 
support the development of commerce. There is a good story of “Merchant of Rhodes” 
told by Cicero:14 let’s suppose the Rhodians were starving awaiting for the Alexandrian 
grain ships to arrive. Should the fi rst merchant who reaches the shore let the people 
know about the others to arrive soon or sell the grain quickly for the maximum price? 
Well, philosopher’s (and advocate’s!) answer is simple: morality requires truth, but law-
8 I ACa 530/04.
9 I ACa 1008/12.
10 “Le dol est une cause de nullité de la convention lorsque les manoeuvres pratiquées par l’une des parties 
sont telles, qu’il est évident que, sans ces manoeuvres, l’autre partie n’aurait pas contracté. Il ne se présume 
pas et doit être prouvé”.
11 A.J.B. Sirks, La laesio enormis en droit romain et Byzantine, “The Legal History Review” 1985, 
vol. 53, p. 291–307.
12 B. Sitek, O koncepcji “iustum pretium” w historycznym zarysie (Historical outline of the iustum pre-
tium idea), “Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Prawo” 2001, no. 12, p. 17–31.
13 W. Wołodkiewicz, L`edictum de pretiis di Diocleziano. Il mito dell`omnipotenza del legislatore [in:] 
Leges Sapere. Studia i prace dedykowane profesorowi Januszowi Sondlowi (Studies and works dedicated to 
Professor Janusz Sondel), ed. W. Uruszczak, P. Święcicka, A. Kremer, Kraków 2008, p. 687.
14 Cicero, De offi cis, 3, XXIII, 57, see also R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations…, p. 257, also 
discussed by D. Weibel, Aufstieg und “Fall” des alexandrinischer Getreidehändlers, Ausgewählte Informa-
tionsprobleme beim Kauf von Cicero bis Savigny [in:] Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane durchquert, Fest-
schrift für Knut Wolfgang Nörr, ed. M. Ascheri and others, Köln–Weimar–Wien 2003, pp. 1057–1074, and 
W. Decock, J. Hallebeek, Pre-contractual duties to inform in Early Modern Scholasticism, “Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis” 2010, vol. 1–2, pp. 89–133. For a bona fi des perspective and discussion of this case see 
especially Martin J. Schermaier in: Good Faith in European Contract Law, eds. R. Zimmermann, S. Whit-
taker, Cambridge 2000, pp. 91–92.
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yers would not tie business with honesty too closely.15 For Cicero, an advocate but not 
a lawyer,16 it was a good opportunity to gain profi t without deceit. Zimmermann refers 
here to a similar modern case, touching the core and art of commerce: Laidlaw vs. Organ 
(1817).17 During the war between the USA and England, the tobacco prices were very 
low as no export was possible. Organ received an early information that the peace treaty 
had been signed and quickly bought a great quantity of tobacco. Although he was asked 
to explain this unexpected purchase, the plaintiff did not reveal his secret. As a result, 
farmers had been selling very cheap, soon the prices doubled, but the court did not void 
the contract. Laidlaw vs. Organ entered upon the caveat emptor rule in the USA and 
nowadays is regarded one of the most important cases in the development of the contract 
law. It was also the warm-up before the commodities trading.18 It is noteworthy that in 
2008 the US Congress amended the Commodity Exchange Act and added Laidlaw to it. 
Trading did not have to be preceded with disclosing “nonpublic information that may 
be material to the market price, rate, or level of the commodity or transaction, except as 
necessary to make any statement made to the other person in or in connection with the 
transaction not misleading in any material respect”.19
The controversial decision in Laidlaw might have been expected after the famous 
myth story of Nathan Rotschild, who learnt about the Waterloo defeat with the help of 
carrier pigeons and his own fast couriers over 24 hours before it became public, and he 
gained enormous profi ts on the stock exchange. The point of special interest for lawyers 
(the case, if really happened, was never tried by any court) is a classical bluff made by 
Rotschild, who performed a brilliant example of short selling, later called “Waterloo 
coup”.20 Having known about the Waterloo, he arrived at the stock exchange and publical-
ly started selling government bonds which he owned before. Other brokers joined him in 
panic, certain that Rotschild somehow found out the battle was won by Napoleon. When 
in a few hours prices had fallen over twenty times, Nathan Rotschild’s brokers silently 
bought all the bonds back almost for nothing, and by the time Wellington’s marathon 
runner fi nally reached London, Rotschild had already been a millionaire. Was it a deceit 
from a lawyer’s point of view? A great Roman lawyer, Julius Paulus „Prudentissimus” 
would surely oppose – Non omne quod licet honestum est (D.50,17,144, what is allowed 
is not always honest).21 We can see that Laidlaw vs. Organ is almost identical and judges 
15 On the issue of truth in Roman law see the recently published T. Giaro, Römische Rechtswahrheiten: 
ein Gedankenexperiment, Frankfurt am Main 2007.
16 J. Powell, J. Paterson, Cicero the Advocate, Oxford 2004.
17 Peter Laidlaw and Company v. Hector M. Organ, 15 U.S. 2 Wheat. 178 (1817), on this case see 
M. Trebilcock, The Limits…, p. 113; A. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts 
[in:] Economic Analysis of the Law: Selected Readings, ed. D. Wittman, John Wiley & Sons 2008, pp. 75–78.
18 On the origins of commodities’ Roman law see K. Wyrwińska, Kontrakty aleatoryjne w prawie rzymskim 
a współczesne towarowe instrumenty fi nansowe (Alaetory contracts in Roman law versus modern commodity 
contracts), unpublished doctoral thesis (2010), available at Jagiellonian Library Lectorium.
19 J.W. Markham, Law Enforcement and the History of Financial Market Manipulation, 2013, p. 245.
20 See D. McCarthy, International Business History: A Contextual and Case Approach, Greenwood 
Publishing Group 1994, p. 26; L. Harris, Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners, 
Oxford 2003, p. 266.
21 Paul. D. 50,17,144. It is remarkable how Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, a famous enfant terrible of 
Renaissance, himself a lawyer, argues with D.1,1,10 honeste vivere inspired by D.50 regulae iuris, see De 
incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum declamatio invectiva, Cologne 1527: Vim vi repellere licet. Frangenti 
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strictly followed Paulus. However, if we consider the problem as a purely business mat-
ter, we may dangerously approach the modern idea of “insider trading” – the unauthor-
ized use of classifi ed information with the aim of gaining profi t before it becomes public. 
One good example is the 1964 Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co. case.22 Having been secretly informed about pro fi table mining activities, the 
company offi cers bought shares of Texas Gulf. At the same time, they offi cially denied 
it in order to mislead investors. The government agency, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) succeeded to show Texas Gulf insiders the fi ne line between good 
business and ethics.23
Another important comparative issue found in Laidlaw vs Organ is a completely 
different understanding of the mistake and deceit as a possible defect of will. Laidlaw 
expressed his will in the contract of sale affected by the mistake concerning the state of 
war and the tobacco export blockade. This mistake (error) however, as decided by Judge 
Marshall, could not result as a defect of will. Why? Modern American law strongly lim-
its the possibilities to void contracts for error, leaving the party to suffer losses, which 
may be understood rather as a result of the liberal attitude to commerce and market, typi-
cal for the U.S. economy. Things look different in Europe, where the Laidlaw case would 
probably be decided on the grounds of the quite strict regulation of the mistake and de-
ceit. At the same time courts in Europe are far more indulgent, and the mistaken or often 
deceived party may seek the remedy. Where is the border between a mistake and deceit? 
If both parties were ignorant of important facts, this would be obvious. If only one party 
was ignorant, but the second would not realize that, it that would still be a mistake. But 
if the second party is aware of the situation or even may easily get informed, the mistake 
becomes a deceit or equal to deceit.
Trying to research the limits of such mistakes and price-to-value relation, let us have 
a look at the Anatole vs. Bob example case, provided and discussed by Ruth Sefton-
Green24. Anatole, a Frenchman, an art historian working for the Orsay museum sold 
some of his privately owned paintings to Bob’s NY gallery for a bargain price, sure his 
fi dem fi des frangatur eidem: Fallere fallentem non est fraus. Dolosus doloso nullo tenetur. Culpa cum culpa 
compensari potest. Male meriti nulla debent iustitia, nec fi de gaudere. Volenti non fi t iniuria. Licitum est 
contrahentibus se decipere. Tantum valet res quanti vendi posset. Item, ut liceat sibi consulere cum damno 
alterius. Ad impossibile neminem obligari. Item, si te vel me confundi oporteat, potius eligam te confundi 
quam me. On this, see I. Maclean, Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law, Cam-
bridge 1992, p. 154.
22 See Dennis C. Hansley, Securities Regulation – Trading by Insiders – S.E.C v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d.833(2d cir.1968), “William and Mary Law Review” 1969, vol. 10, issue 3, pp. 755–760.
23 One purely non-legal but adequate example may be recalled here. During World War II, in the oc-
cupied Warsaw, the chief-commander of the Polish resistance Home Army, General Tadeusz Komorowski 
“Bór”, gave the order to commence the Warsaw Uprising, an attempt to liberate the city. As the exact date and 
hour of the uprising had to remain a secret, there was no way of warning and protecting the people of Warsaw, 
especially women and children. General “Bór” did not say a word even to his own pregnant wife. After the 
war Komorowski explained he could not warn every woman in Warsaw, so there was no excuse for a special 
treatment of his own family. During the 63 days of the Warsaw Uprising 16 000 soldiers of the Polish Home 
Army and up to 200 000 civilians were killed by German forces under the command of SS-Obergruppenfüh-
rer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. This was more than in Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear attacks together. 
See N.  Davies, Rising ‘44: The Battle for Warsaw, New York 2005.
24 R. Sefton-Green, M.J. Schermaier, J. Cartwright, Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European 
Contract Law, Cambridge 2005, pp. 88–130. Other system’s remedies are also discussed.
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collection consisted of talented, but unknown authors’ works. After some time Bob’s 
experts found out that the purchased paintings were in fact Degas’s genuine master-
pieces of enormous value. They were put up for sale and that is how Anatole found out 
what fortune he had lost. Is there any chance for him to claim the money back? We have 
two professionals, a contract of sale and their common mistake as to the content of the 
declaration. We have facts: both Bob and Anatole were ignorant of the real value. Bob 
could not recognize it even after French experts had been consulted (they were wrong). 
There are many unanswered questions as well. Should the natural economic risk of the 
contract be devoted? Does Bob deserve legal protection? Bob was enormously enriched 
– had it been justifi ed? Post factum, we know Bob’s counterperformance was defi nitely 
inadequate, so should not Anatole – at least – get a “half” remedy like Roman laesio 
enormis?25
We can clearly understand that, after Laidlaw case, the US courts will decide quite 
differently than the European ones, where ABGB allow at least 50% restitution on laesio 
enormis, but similar to English – rather hopeless for Anatol. The common law “undue 
infl uence” may not be used, as there are no stronger and weaker parties, neither was there 
a misrepresentation – no false statements were made, and the mistake would probably 
be regarded as “not suffi ciently serious” (Bell vs. Lever Bros.). The French law will 
not help Anatol, especially after the “Baldus case” (RTDCiv 2000, 566) where Cour 
de Cassation decided that even the professional seller needs not to inform the buyer 
of the facts known to him.26 Anatol may expect some mercy under German judgment: 
BGB allows to void the contract on base of the mistake (Irrtum, BGB§119.2), which 
requires a written notifi cation only – made on time, to Bob. If Bob sold paintings, Anatol 
would get the value compensation. Should this remedy fail (Anatol was a specialist), 
there is still hope – basing on the failure of the basis of the transaction (Fehlen der 
Geschäftsgrundlagen, BGB §313 Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage), where the due price 
is increased to the real market value. Anatol will not recover the paintings, but neither 
will he suffer losses. However, this will work if the court does not reject the remedy on 
the ground of uncertain authorship as the base of the contract and the risk as a part of 
Geschäftsgrundlagen. It is also possible for Bob to oppose the claim of increased value 
on the basis of the reversed casum sentit dominus rule.27 The safest option for Anatol 
seems to be the Austrian version of Roman laesio enormis (ABGB §934f, Verkürzung 
über die Hälfte) giving him at least half of the money. Anatol would rather suffer his loss 
under the Polish civil law (art. 84 k.c.). The mistake may be a substantial defect of will 
only if Bob caused the mistake, knew about it or would recognize it. None of those facts 
occurred.
25 See Ch. Becker, Die Lehre von der laesio enormis in der Sicht der heutigen Wucherproblematik: Aus-
gewongenheit der Vertragsverhältnisse und der 138 BGB, Köln 1993.
26 Contrary, see the similar discussion on Célimène vs. Damien (where a specialist bought Monet’s paint-
ing from a non-professional old lady), R. Sefton-Green, M.J. Schermaier, J. Cartwright, Mistake…, p. 131. 
The same problem discussed on Degas Drawing case in: Good Faith in European Contract Law, eds. R. Zim-
mermann, S. Whittaker, Cambridge 2000, p. 208.
27 On this, see analysis see: R. Sefton-Green M.J. Schermaier, J. Cartwright, Mistake…, p. 103 and
W. Flume, Der Kauf von Kunstgegenständen und die Urheberschaft des Kunstwerkes, “Juristen Zeitung” 
1991, Bd. 13, pp. 633–684.
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Another issue I would like to mention is the signifi cance of good faith in freedom of 
contracts. Bona fi des used to be crucial for Roman law, and it still remains important for 
modern private law systems.28 English courts have never accepted this purely Roman 
perspective, but the American ones may demand the contracting parties to keep to good 
faith and fair dealing rules.29 Even Roman law experienced problems with malicious 
contracting parties, at least before mala fi des safeguard was introduced to private law. 
The origins of actio de dolo, immortal equitable remedy, are well reported30 by Cicero, 
whose close friend Aquillus Gallus had to decide upon a case of deceit that can be a good 
warning even in the modern times. Canius, a noble and wealthy Roman citizen, was 
looking for a holiday villa located in Sicily on the sea coast where he could spend his 
free time in quiet. Having found out about his wish and about his wealth, a tricky local 
banker Pythius invited him to his country house overlooking the idyllic seashore and the 
bay, full of (hired) fi shermen boats, whose owners kept on bringing fresh fi sh to Pythius. 
He mentioned the bay was full of fi sh and this location was the only one nearby where 
the fresh water was available for fi shing (which was not true). Canius swallowed the 
bait: after much haggling and hesitating Pythius fi nally “agreed” to sell his property for 
an enormously high price, much over its real value. As the banker was well aware of the 
rigorous regulations of the bona fi des contract of sale, he persuaded Canius to pay the 
price using a kind of the commercial loan called “book debt” (nomen transscripticium), 
which created a new obligation independent from its real causa – buying the land prop-
erty. Thus, any complaints or claims of Canius could not undo his fate. Despite the fraud, 
Pythius could easily sue Canius for his payment (actio certae pecuniae) without raising 
any equitable dispute as the suit was stricti iuris, allowing no judge to ask the most obvi-
ous question – why Canius had to pay Pythius the money?
If it had not been for the pretor’s idea and power, Canius and other victims would 
not have ever been able to get the remedy, as the stricti iuris suit excluded any argument 
other than formal31. Old ius civile could no longer help here, as all formal requirements 
were met and no deceit charge was recognized by this law. Thus pretorian dolus malus 
(cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum) could prevent usus iuris from collapsing into 
abusus iuris. Even now it is not always simple for the court to distinguish between the 
“good” and “bad” party. One cannot demand the party’s innocent conduct throughout 
the whole life: in order to defend their rights using the charge of “unclean hands,” it is 
necessary to show the direct relation (nexus) between somebody’s wrongdoing and the 
rights he tries to enforce.
This is a great historical circle we made from Cicero’s times till modern law. Apart 
from Cicero explanations, Laidlaw, commodity trading, culpa in contrahendo and many 
other cases, we still do not know the right answer: was it an unexpected opportunity to 
28 W. Dajczak, L’uso della locuzzione “bona fi des” nei giuristi romani del periodo classico per la 
valutazione della diligenza dell’ademprimento del contratto: un’esperienza ispiratrice [in:] Au-dela des 
frontieres: mélanges de droit romain offerts a Witold Wołodkiewicz, t. 2, ed. M. Zabłocka, Warszawa 2000, 
pp. 185–196.
29 E.A. Farnsworth, Comparative Contract Law, p. 919.
30 M.T. Cicero, De offi ciis, 3, XXIII, 58.
31 R. Sefton-Green, M.J. Schermaier, J. Cartwright, Mistake…, p. 86.
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earn good money, or a “deceitful machination”?32 Should the freedom of contracts be 
the general excuse? How should vir bonus act? And the fi nal question: if, according 
to Martin Schermaier, Roman law would not survive without bona fi des as the core of 
contract, should we expect modern codifi cations to collapse if they provide too wide 
freedom?33
32 See M.J. Schermaier in: Good Faith in European Contract Law, eds. R. Zimmermann, S. Whittaker, 
Cambridge 2000, p. 92.
33 Ibidem.
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